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Abstract: The Third Earl of Shaftesbury has been celebrated for his commitment to free 
public discourse regulated only by standards of politeness, a commitment exemplified by 
his defense of the freedom to ridicule. This article complicates this picture by tracing 
Shaftesbury’s response to the early eighteenth-century crisis of public speech precipitated 
by the demise of pre-publication censorship and growing uncertainty about intellectual 
property in the print trade. Shaftesbury, the article shows, was a determined opponent of 
pre-publication censorship through licensing, but he was also aware of the dangers posed 
to religious liberty by, in particular, clerical attacks on toleration, and sought ways to 
curb them that included corrective action by the state. When the Whigs opted to impeach 
the High-Church cleric Henry Sacheverell, whose supporters had capitalized on an 
unregulated print market to disseminate his sermons ridiculing Whig principles, 
Shaftesbury expressed satisfaction with their choice. But he did not stop there. The article 
reads Shaftesbury’s 1710 Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author against the backdrop of the 
Sacheverell controversy, and shows how the earl used it to undercut Sacheverell’s claim 
that clerical speech enjoyed special status.  
                                                
∗ The author would like to thank Jonathan Barry, Theo Christov, Christine Jackson-Holzberg, Celeste 
McNamara, Rebekah Sterling, participants at the Exeter Political Theory Reading Group, Duncan Kelly as 
Editor, and two anonymous reviewers for enormously helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 
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Few historical moments have seen more fraught debate over the regulation of 
public speech than early eighteenth-century England. The explosion of print publication 
from 1695 onwards, mounting insecurity among Whigs that the political gains of 1688 
could still be reversed, and Tory worries that dissenters were defaming the Church, all led 
to heated exchanges over the scope of permissible speech and the most effective means of 
suppressing the impermissible. It was a crisis of authorization that found echoes at the 
level of the book trade itself, where authors, printers, and booksellers vied with one 
another over how copyright and intellectual property should be divided up following the 
demise of official licensing. Complaints about piracy, unauthorized printing, and the 
baleful effects of print monopolies abounded, as did calls for the state to step in and 
restore order.1 
It was during this moment that Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, won notoriety for seeming to deny that public speech needed to be regulated 
much at all, recommending that even ridicule and raillery be freed from restraint.2 
Englishmen granted such liberty, Shaftesbury insisted in his Essay on the Freedom of Wit 
and Humor, would in time learn to regulate their conduct in accordance with emerging 
standards of politeness. Unfavorably comparing the stewardship of public discourse to 
the stifling of commerce through trade restrictions, he assured his readers that “laying an 
embargo” would prove a poor substitute for the polite refinement that naturally 
                                                
1 Many of these complaints are to be found in John How, Some Thoughts on the Present State of Printing 
and Bookselling (London, 1709). 
2 For the sake of consistency I refer throughout to Anthony Ashley Cooper as “Shaftesbury” even though 
for some of the period I cover he had not yet assumed the title of earl and so would have been known as 
Lord Ashley. 
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accompanied “freedom of conversation.”3 According to some interpreters, Shaftesbury’s 
considered position was that ridicule set free could “replace censorship” altogether and 
that a “complete liberty of expression” could be “granted without danger.”4 
I argue here that Shaftesbury’s position on the regulation of public speech was far 
less straightforward than these lines from the Essay suggest and that previous 
commentators have supposed. Shaftesbury was a determined opponent of pre-publication 
censorship through licensing, but he was also acutely aware of the dangers posed to 
political liberty by unrestrained public speech and sought ways to regulate it that went 
beyond politeness to include corrective action by the state. The kind of speech he singled 
out for such correction changed over time, but as the campaign by High-Church clerics to 
narrow the scope of religious toleration and assert their independence from the state 
gathered steam in the early 1700’s, his pleas for state intervention were increasingly 
directed towards them. By 1710, the year of the impeachment trial of the High-Church 
cleric Henry Sacheverell, Shaftesbury was clear that the greatest threat to religious liberty 
came from that quarter alone. This prompted him, in his Soliloquy, or Advice to an 
Author of that year, to undercut Sacheverell’s claim that clerics enjoyed special authority 
to address the public. In doing so, however, Shaftesbury also summoned a new breed of 
authors and critics who, by obtaining self-knowledge, could make more legitimate claims 
to speak authoritatively to the public on moral and political matters. 
                                                
3 Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times [1711], ed. Lawrence E. Klein 
(Cambridge, 1999), 31. On the importance of politeness to Shaftesbury’s Whig politics see Lawrence 
Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early 
Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1994). 
4 Mogens Laerke, “G.W. Leibniz: Moderation and Censorship” in Mogens Laerke ed. The Use of 
Censorship in the Enlightenment (Leiden, 2009), 155-178, at 171. Lydia Amir similarly argues that 
Shaftesbury defended the freedom to ridicule “unconditionally” and trusted in its “auto-regulation.” Lydia 
B. Amir, Humour and the Good Life in Modern Philosophy: Shaftesbury, Hamann, Kierkegaard (Albany, 
2014), 40 and 43. 
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The article unfolds in three phases. The first section documents Shaftesbury’s 
early interest in censorship and the regulation of print. From the final lapsing of the 
Printing Act in 1695 onward, books, pamphlets and newspapers could be published in 
England without the prior consent of licensers, meaning that the onus of censorship 
shifted towards the scanning of already published writings for libels of Church or state.5 I 
show just how comfortable Shaftesbury was with recourse to such post-hoc censorship 
even as he seemed to chafe against legal constraints on public speech in his writings. The 
second section reveals how, despite his insistence on the value of ridicule as a remedy for 
religious extremism, by 1710 Shaftesbury had recognized its limits as a political response 
to opponents of toleration and was broadly supportive of the decision of the Whig Lords 
to silence Sacheverell, the most vocal critic of toleration at the time, by law rather than by 
the press. Finally, I turn to Shaftesbury’s Soliloquy, a text often celebrated as 
foundational document in the history of aesthetics, but rarely read with an eye to its 
immediate political context. I offer grounds for seeing Soliloquy as a timely intervention 
into Sacheverell-era debates over authorized and unauthorized public speech. For 
Shaftesbury, I show, establishing truly authoritative discourse on moral and political 
matters had to begin with self-cultivation on the part of the author, and the training of 
critics capable of seeing past bogus claims to authority. But it could not end there. Even 
in Soliloquy, a text putatively dedicated to the individual quest for self-knowledge and the 
cultivation of taste, Shaftesbury made the case that magistrates must be on hand to 
correct public speech that threatens political and religious freedom.  
                                                
5 As Roger Lund points out, the demise of licensing effectively transformed the common law courts of 
England into “textual interpreters” charged with judging whether seemingly innocuous publications 
harbored seditious intent. Roger Lund, Ridicule, Religion and the Politics of Wit in Augustan England 
(Burlington, 2012), 196. 
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I. The Changing Face of Censorship: From Licensing to Post-hoc Sanctions 
 
Shaftesbury began his political career at a moment of intense discussion on the 
merits of pre-publication censorship and the best way to bring order to a chaotic print 
industry. When he entered Parliament in 1695 as MP for Poole he would have known that 
his political associates had expended considerable effort to prevent the renewal of the 
1662 Printing Act (and the pre-publication licensing that went with it) earlier that year 
and why they did so. His former tutor John Locke had experienced the discomfort of 
having a work that he co-authored with the First Earl of Shaftesbury burned as a 
“dangerous Book” by the House of Lords in 1675 and had papers seized during the 
Exclusion Crisis of 1681.6 Unsurprisingly then in 1695 Locke campaigned against 
renewal of the Printing Act, circulating a critical commentary on several of its clauses to 
members of his ‘College’ and to Shaftesbury (then Lord Ashley) himself.7 Portraying the 
Act as the regrettable product of Restoration deference to Church demands for control 
over the press, Locke scorned its allowance for wardens of the Company of Stationers to 
search premises for unlicensed books as a “mark of slavery.”8 Such searches were, to 
Locke’s mind, not only unjust but also unnecessary because anyone publishing material 
deemed “seditious or against law” could always be made “answerable” after the fact.9 
                                                
6 The burned publication was A Letter from a Person of Quality, to his Friend in the Country. Geoff Kemp 
ed., Censorship and the Press, vol. 3 (London, 2009), 151. 
7 The Printing Act is sometimes referred to the Licensing Act owing to its stipulation that texts be pre-
approved by a licenser before going to print. The licenser responsible varied in accordance with the subject 
matter. Religious texts, for instance, usually had to be licensed by the Bishop of London or the Archbishop 
of Canterbury.    
8 John Locke, “Liberty of the Press” in Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie (Cambridge, 1997), 336. 
9 Ibid., 331. 
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This was an early indication that for some in Shaftesbury’s circle compulsory imprints of 
an author’s or printer’s name could serve as a viable substitute for pre-publication 
censorship, allowing crimes committed in print to be easily traced back to those 
responsible. Indeed, the bill Edward Clarke introduced to replace the Printing Act (and 
that Locke welcomed) stipulated that books must contain the name of the publisher so 
that they may be “answerable at law as if they were the author.”10  
Crucially, however, censorship was not Locke’s only or even primary concern in 
opposing renewal of the Printing Act. He was especially animated by a desire to tilt the 
balance of power in the print industry away from printers and towards readers and 
authors. Writing to Clarke in January 1693 he urged that any law renewing Licensing 
must consider the fate of “book buyers” whose access to “fairer and more correct 
Editions” of particularly Latin and Greek works had been blocked by “ignorant and lazy 
stationers” determined to suppress competition, maintain their copyright privileges, and 
keep prices high.11 He also determined, in a series of proposed amendments to Clarke’s 
replacement bill, that every author be guaranteed a “property in his copy,” a swipe at a 
system that allowed printers to obtain intellectual property by getting hold of a 
manuscript and being the first to print it.12 Taken as a whole, then, Locke’s commentary 
gestured towards a system in which authors assumed greater ownership over their works 
while remaining responsible for any illegalities those works may contain, a system that 
was coming close to realization when Shaftesbury composed Soliloquy in 1710. 
                                                
10 A summary of Clarke’s “Bill for the Better Regulating of Printing” is reproduced in Goldie ed., Political 
Essays, 337-8. 
11 John Locke to Edward Clarke, January 2nd 1693 in Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E.S. de Beer, 8 
vols. (Oxford, 1978), 4: Letter No. 1586. 
12 Locke, “Liberty of the Press,” 338. As William St Clair explains, “the act of printing by itself created a 
private intellectual property […] Although an author could own a manuscript […] until 1710 no author 
could, under English law or customary practice, own a text.”  William St Clair, The Reading Nation in the 
Romantic Period (Cambridge, 2004), 51.   
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It is likely Shaftesbury imbibed some of Locke’s hostility towards the licensing 
regime because he appears to have devoted some of his brief time in the House of 
Commons to preventing its return, much as Locke had pressed Clarke to do. On previous 
occasions when the Printing Act had expired it had been successfully renewed by MPs 
either worried about excessive press freedom or swayed by the lobbying efforts of the 
Stationers Company. After 1695, however, attempts at reviving the Act were frustrated 
by Parliamentary committees, one of which Shaftesbury joined in April of 1697. The 
historian Geoff Kemp finds this particular committee’s decision to block the Press 
Regulation Bill (the only legislation drafted between 1695 and 1710 that we know for 
certain tried to reinstate a form of licensing) “unsurprising” because its membership 
“pitted tory MPs with a frequent interest in press regulation… against an imposing set of 
Whig counter-parts in Robert Molesworth, Walter Moyle and Anthony Ashley Cooper, 
the future 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury.”13 We cannot know for certain how Shaftesbury voted, 
and according to Parliamentary rules of the time members could not be named to 
committee on a bill they had opposed outright. However, as David Hayton has noted, 
Shaftesbury and his Whig colleagues likely made a tactical decision to keep their 
opposition to the bill concealed initially and so thereby preserve the opportunity to 
“sabotage” it in committee.14  
If Shaftesbury opposed licensing he by no means favored the removal of all 
restraints on publishing. The lapsing of the Printing Act resulted not so much in the end 
of censorship as in a renewed emphasis on the use of libel laws to punish the authors and 
                                                
13 Geoff Kemp, “The 'End of Censorship' and the Politics of Toleration, from Locke to Sacheverell,” 
Parliamentary History 31/1 (2012), 47-68, at 58. Kemp makes clear that many supposed attempts to 
reinstate licensing were nothing of the sort.   
14 David Hayton, “Moral Reform and Country Politics in the Late Seventeenth-Century House of 
Commons,” Past & Present, 128 (1990), 48-91, at 70.  
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printers of already published works and so deter seditious writing.15 Whigs during Anne’s 
reign increasingly looked to such laws as their preferred way of stemming the growing 
tide of High-Church polemics against key Whig causes like toleration.16 Daniel Defoe, in 
his Essay on the Freedom of the Press combined, as Locke had done, criticism of 
licensing with a demand that booksellers be obliged to imprint the name of the author and 
printer on each item sold so that if the book’s contents were found libelous there would 
“be somebody found to answer for it.”17 Soon after, in 1705, Whigs in the House of 
Lords succeeded in passing a resolution declaring any insinuation that the Church was in 
danger to be seditious, signaling that even if claims that toleration imperiled established 
religion could legally find their way into print, their authors could still face punishment.18 
What little we know of Shaftesbury’s time in the House of Lords suggests that he 
approved of this strategy and that his distaste for licensing was matched by an enthusiasm 
for these post-hoc methods of press regulation.    
Having assumed his father’s title of earl in 1699 and entered the Lords in 1700, 
Shaftesbury retained an interest in press regulation and was present at the defeat of yet 
another Press bill in January 1702. His eagerness to involve himself in the issue is 
apparent by the fact that he was among only twenty members of the House present to 
debate the legislation, the only item up for discussion that day.19 A closer look, however, 
                                                
15  St Clair, The Reading Nation in the Romantic Period, 85. 
16 Alex W. Barber, “Censorship, Salvation and the Preaching of Francis Higgins: A Reconsideration of 
High Church Politics and Theology in the Early 18th Century,” Parliamentary History 33/1 (2014), 114-
139, at 115. 
17 Daniel Defoe, Essay on the Regulation of the Press (London, 1704), 22.  
18 Shaftesbury did not participate in this debate. His declining health forced him to leave London and he 
was at his home in St. Giles on 9 November 1705. Robert Voitle, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury: 1671-
1713 (Baton Rouge, 1984), 242. The ‘Church in Danger’ debate took place on 6 December.  
19 “House of Lords Journal 17: 24 January 1702” in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 17, 1701-
1705 (London, 1767-1830), 23; Mark Goldie and Geoff Kemp, “Silencing Jacobitism” in eds. Mark Goldie 
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shows that his ardor for an end to censorship was qualified by his insistence that seditious 
writings still be punished. In particular, the earl had few qualms about punishing those 
who challenged in print the Whig interpretation of the 1688 revolution as a legitimate act 
of resistance. A clause added to the 1702 bill, found among Shaftesbury’s papers and 
written in his hand, aimed at “further prevention of Printing Seditious Books and 
pamphlets and for surpressing all falce [sic] and pernitious opinions tending to weaken or 
oppose the severall acts of Parliament lately made for the security of his Majesty’s Person 
and Governm’t.”20 (The clause appears alongside Shaftesbury’s copy of Locke’s 
commentary on the Printing Act discussed above). The acts of Parliament “lately made” 
were laws confirming the validity of Anne’s succession against the claims of the 
Jacobites. Significantly, Shaftesbury’s clause, had it been adopted, would have extended 
the scope of government oversight beyond printing to include all forms of political 
speech (“printing writing Preaching or other speaking”).21  
To argue in 1702 for the suppression of writings denying the legitimacy of the 
forthcoming Hanoverian succession was not in itself that controversial. Nevertheless, 
Shaftesbury’s zeal for preventing publications of this kind in the above clause provides 
an early indication that there were certain forms of public speech he was not prepared to 
countenance. At the very least, it suggests that the range of speech he considered the 
                                                                                                                                            
and Geoff Kemp, Censorship and the Press, 1580-1720 Vol. 4 1696-1720 (London, 2009), 280; Kemp, 
“The End of Censorship,” 61. 
20 Goldie and Kemp, “Silencing Jacobitism,” 283. The clause is reproduced in full in Michael G. Pooritz, 
The Third Earl of Shaftesbury and his Unpublished Correspondence, 1671-1713 (unpublished Ph.D thesis, 
University of Oxford, 1926). Manuel Luis P.G.B de Miranda concludes from this “two page manuscript in 
legalese” that Shaftesbury was “keen to establish a framework for controlling the press in order to prevent 
libelous publications.” Manuel Luis P.G.B de Miranda, The Moral, Social and Political Thought of the 
Third Earl of Shaftesbury, 1671-1713: Unbelief and Whig Republicanism in the Early Enlightenment, 
(unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994), 276.  Kemp notes that this clause was “out of 
keeping” with the “unspecific spirit” of the Bill. Kemp, “The End of Censorship,” 61n. 
21 Goldie and Kemp, “Silencing Jacobitism,” 283.  
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government entitled to correct was broad enough to include criticism of the Revolution 
and its principles. And it could get broader still; the early 1700’s were years in which 
England’s involvement in the Spanish War of Succession became an increasingly fraught 
issue, and Whigs began tentatively expanding the range of activities considered seditious 
to include agitations for peace. Again, the hand that Shaftesbury played in this move is 
visible. Between December 1701 and January 1702 he co-authored a tract with John 
Toland entitled Paradoxes of State which bluntly equated domestic war opposition to 
sympathy with foreign enemies: “There is no Faction but a Foren one.”22 Most tellingly, 
it also declared that the “Spirit of those who, in the present circumstances of the nation 
and of Europe, wou’d declare for Peace and against a War, is in reality a Spirit of 
Sedition.”23 The pamphlet was silent as to what should be done about those animated by 
such a “Spirit” but the use of the language of sedition suggests that all options, including 
legal sanctions, were on the table.  
If Shaftesbury was at ease with the use of state power to quell opposition to a 
cause he deemed vital to the progress of liberty, he also carved out a role for it in 
protecting the public from a different sort of threat, namely the corruptive influence of 
libertines and deists. Shaftesbury’s own later reputation as a deist and his association with 
radical anti-clericals can cause us to lose sight of his concern that publicizing flagrantly 
irreligious sentiment could undermine public support for religious freedoms. In his 
private notebooks he disavowed “free talking about matters of Religion” lest the devout 
                                                
22 Shaftesbury and John Toland, Paradoxes of State, Relating to the Present Juncture of Affairs in England 
and the rest of Europe; Chiefly grounded on his Majesty’s Princely, Pious, and most Gracious Speech. 
(London, 1702), 4.  
23 Ibid., 8. There are some scattered references to war against France in the Soliloquy itself. The English are 
there described as the “happy nation who not only enjoy” liberty “at home” but who “give life and vigor to 
it abroad” as “head and chief of the European league.” Shaftesbury, Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author 
(London, 1710), 69.    
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be offended, and in his letters to Toland he implored the Irishman to “preserve a character 
such as becomes a man who supports the cause of religion.”24 Easier still to miss, 
however, is that Shaftesbury toyed with the idea that libertine writers should be 
surrendered to the magistrate if they took undue advantage of print freedoms. A 1706 
letter of his to Jean Le Clerc blended optimism that political and religious liberty was on 
the rise (at least in England and Holland) with an un-blinkered assessment of the 
necessity to curb religious profanity through magisterial intervention. Having declared 
himself in favor of an “entire philosophical liberty” Shaftesbury conceded to Le Clerc 
that the “profane mocking and scurrilous language” of some irreligious writers posed the 
kind of danger to the public good that informal censure was powerless to prevent. In this 
case “only,” therefore, he would allow “the magistrate to interpose on our side” 
categorically dismissing any further appeals to the state beyond this exception as 
exhibiting “cowardice and a kind of mistrust of our cause.”25     
Shaftesbury echoed the argument of his letter to Le Clerc in the very same 
published works that have earned him his reputation as a proponent of free expression. In 
the Letter Concerning Enthusiasm of 1708 he affirmed the need for some continued 
government oversight of public discourse even as he celebrated the post-licensing 
freedom to ridicule, adding the weighty qualifier that “if men are vicious, petulant or 
abusive, the magistrate may correct them.”26 But if the argument remained similar, the 
                                                
24 Shaftesbury, “Askêmata” in Standard Edition: Complete Works, Correspondence and Posthumous 
Writings, eds. Wolfram Benda, Christine Jackson-Holzberg, Patrick Müller & Friedrich A. Uehlein, vol. II, 
6 (Stuttgart, 2011), 108; Shaftesbury to Toland, 21 July 1701. TNA: PRO 30/24/21 Part 2. As Philip 
Connell puts it, Shaftesbury was keen to “dissociate” the Whig commonwealth tradition from its 
“intellectual filiations” to libertine philosophy. Philip Connell, Secular Chains: Whig Poetics and the 
Church in Danger (Oxford, 2016), 158-9.   
25 Shaftesbury to Jean Le Clerc, 6 March 1705 in The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical 
Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, ed. Benjamin Rand,  (New York, 1900), 353. 
26 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, 7. 
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group identified as that most likely to deserve correction from the state shifted from 
“scurrilous” free thinkers to High-Church clerics abusing the privileges of the pulpit. 
Shaftesbury’s 1709 Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour thus applauded corrective 
actions recently directed against insubordinate Churchmen whose “talons” the magistrate 
had needed to “pare.”27 As Shaftesbury presented matters, it was precisely because the 
magistrate had put these clerics in their place that the earl now felt sufficiently secure to 
be “laugh’d at” or even “rail’d” at by his High-Church enemies.28    
By the spring of 1710 Shaftesbury would want the government to take action once 
again against unruly clerics, this time in the formidable form of Henry Sacheverell and 
his supporters. Parliament’s impeachment of Sacheverell, culminating in the burning of 
his published sermons, coincided almost exactly with its attempt to bring order to the 
print industry by enacting the 1710 Copyright Act, the first law to vest authors with 
intellectual property in their texts. These two interventions by Parliament, each a 
response to problems of unregulated public speech that had lingered unresolved since the 
end of licensing, formed the immediate backdrop to the 1710 Soliloquy. Mapping the 
debates within Whig circles about how to respond to an author like Sacheverell, 
therefore, will be integral to our understanding of Shaftesbury’s purpose in that text.  
 
II. The Sacheverell Controversy and the Limits of Ridicule 
 
If the end of licensing curtailed the Church’s ability to regulate the press (the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London had been the chief licensers of 
                                                
27 Ibid., 68. 
28 Ibid., 68 
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religious publications) it had also made it easier for High-Church pamphleteers to 
publicize their disenchantment with toleration and win adherents to their cause. On 5 
November 1709 Henry Sacheverell did exactly this in a sermon delivered at St Paul’s 
Cathedral entitled The Perils of False Brethren both in Church and State. Sacheverell 
took his title from Corinthians, chapter 11, verse 26, where Paul relates his encounter in 
Corinth with pretenders to the true faith who, on Sacheverell’s telling, began “ridiculing” 
him.29 Sacheverell’s avowed purpose in the sermon was to weed out the equivalent “False 
Brethren” of his own time by exposing a grand political conspiracy that had been 
“Hatch’d in the Cabinet-Council of Hell.”30 Implicated in this conspiracy were not only 
religious dissenters or “self-conceited Enthusiast[s]” but also anyone who declared even 
the mildest sympathy for the “Principles of Forty One,” a reference to the doctrines 
justifying the Parliamentary revolt against Charles I in the early 1640’s.31 The majority of 
Sacheverell’s sermon consisted of him pouring scorn on these principles, and those who 
abided by them, one by one: the doctrine of “Resistance” was not only “illegal” but had 
been already “redicul’d out of Countenance;”32 “toleration” served no other purpose than 
to indulge “monsters” and “vipers” in the “bosom” of the Church.33 Most invidious of all, 
however, were those “Occasional Conformists,” the false brethren of the sermon’s title, 
who feigned conformity to the established religion and loyalty to the state, but who will 
“Betray either whenever it is within their Power.”34  
                                                
29 Henry Sacheverell, The Perils of False Brethren both in Church and State: Set forth in a Sermon 
Preach’d before The Right Honorourable, The Lord Mayor, Alderman, and Citizens of London, at the 
Cathedral Church of St Paul, on the 5th of November, 1709 (London, 1709), 6. 
30 Ibid., 2.  
31 Ibid., 2 and 21. 
32 Ibid.,19. 
33 Ibid.,25. 
34 Ibid., 33. 
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For all its bluster and seeming lack of self-restraint, Sacheverell’s sermon was 
carefully calibrated to inflict maximum discomfort on his political foes. Parliament, 
dominated at the time by Whigs sympathetic to the very doctrines Sacheverell had 
denounced, had consistently opposed High-Church attempts to ban occasional 
conformists from holding political office.35 On Sacheverell’s conspiratorial logic, this 
made its members guilty of harboring “vipers.” But his timing was still more impeccably 
chosen. November 5th was a date doubly significant to Whig political mythology, 
coincidentally marking both the foiling of Guy Fawkes’ Gun Powder plot in 1605, and 
the landing of William of Orange’s army at the culmination of the 1688 revolution. Even 
Sacheverell’s language and turns of phrase, dismissed by one contemporary observer as 
resulting in an “incoherent jumble” were precisely chosen so as to be maximally goading 
without being defamatory.36 Apart from a single oblique reference to Godolphin (“Wiley 
Volpones”) the sermon avoided directly accusing any individual of conspiring against the 
state, and Sacheverell cleared it for traces of libel with three different lawyers in advance 
of going to print.37  
Once published, the sermon quickly became a sensation, with six pirated editions 
entering circulation (five in the remainder of 1709 alone) and over 100,000 copies sold. 
Its success caught the Whig political elite off guard and prompted an urgent debate on 
how best to respond. The contours of this debate have been sketched before, but what 
                                                
35 An occasional conformist was anyone who received communion in the established Anglican Church in 
order to gain eligibility for office but who nevertheless continued to worship as a dissenter. Mark Knights, 
The Devil in Disguise: Deception, Delusion and Fanaticism in the Early English Enlightenment (Oxford, 
2011), 144.  
36 Alexander Cunningham, The History of Great Britain: From the Revolution in 1688, to the Accession of 
George the First, 2 vols. (London, 1787), II: 276.  Cunningham was a contemporary observer whose Latin 
history of the period was translated and published in 1787.   
37 Sacheverell, Perils of False Brethren, 40; Geoffrey Holmes, The Trial of Doctor Sacheverell (London, 
1973), 73.  
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interests me here is how it broadened into a more general exchange over the efficacy of 
ridicule as a response to Sacheverell’s polemics. Troublesome for the Whigs was not so 
much the content of Sacheverell’s accusation (which advanced little beyond what earlier 
defenders of High-Church Anglicanism had offered) but rather his extraordinary 
rhetorical success in delivering it. Consistently among the reactions to his sermon we find 
a reluctant concession that what Sacheverell lacked in argumentative finesse, he more 
than made up for with his “Talent” at “railing.”38 Even though Sacheverell had been 
mindful to avoid libeling any individuals, he had, in the eyes of the Whigs, brazenly 
ridiculed the Constitution itself and gotten away with it: “will not the world think that we 
do not value as we ought our happy constitution,” Toland asked indignantly, “if they see 
its greatest enemies permitted twice a week to banter, ridicule, libel and insult it.”39 Up 
for urgent deliberation was whether defenders of toleration and liberty of conscience 
should respond in turn with ridicules of their own, or seek to silence Sacheverell using 
another instrument at their disposal, namely law. I will touch upon each of these proposed 
strategies in turn, before turning to Shaftesbury’s own complex relation to the 
Sacheverell controversy.  
Daniel Defoe, writing in his Review of the State of the English Nation in 
December of 1709, was among the first to propose ridicule as the best means of 
containing Sacheverell’s influence: if the Whigs would just “laugh at him,” he predicted, 
the “beast” would soon “vent his gall” and be “quiet.”40 Defoe’s proposal was 
                                                
38 John Dunton, The Bull-Baiting: or, Sacheverell Dress’d up in Fire-works (London, 1709), 43.    
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enthusiastically taken up by a wide variety of aspiring satirists eager to present 
Sacheverell as unworthy of more earnest attention. Some opted for unsophisticated forms 
of character assassination, bluntly accusing Sacheverell of “drunkenness,” “lewdness,” 
“gaming,” “unfaithfulness,” “foul dealing” and “forgery.”41 Others concocted comic 
personas, dubbing him, in one instance, “Don Henrico Furioso de Sacheverillio,” a 
descendent of the hapless Don Quixote.42 Still others adopted a more indirect approach 
by presenting Sacheverell’s text as already approximating self-parody and so advertising 
its own ridiculousness.43 
Defoe’s suggestion that laughing at Sacheverell would suffice failed, however, to 
carry the day with the Whig junto. Somers, to whom Shaftesbury had privately dedicated 
his Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, recommended that Godolphin initiate legal action, but 
cautioned that if Sacheverell were to be tried it would be preferable to do so with 
minimum fuss behind the closed doors of a courtroom. It was a warning that would go 
unheeded: the Whig Members of Parliament had by this point, in Holmes’ words, been 
“goaded beyond endurance” and decided to publicly impeach Sacheverell before the 
House of Lords.44 Wishing to make an example the Whigs subjected him to what in 
essence was a show-trial, designed to signal to the public that the state would brook no 
slander from critics of toleration. Ridicule or satire were deemed insufficient; the 
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objective was now, in the words of one Whig Lord, to “[q]uash”  Sacheverell and “damn 
him.”45 
How did Shaftesbury position himself in the debate on how best to respond to 
Sacheverell? In his anonymously published Letter Concerning Enthusiasm (composed 
two years before Sacheverell took to the pulpit at St Paul’s) Shaftesbury had expressed 
satisfaction with the rise of ridicule in public debate, linking it approvingly with the 
elevation of the public to a position of judgment.46 This might lead us to expect him to 
have inclined towards Defoe’s proposal of answering Sacheverell with counter-ridicules 
in print rather than turning to the law. If, for Shaftesbury, ridicule was the best corrective 
to religious immoderation, then he may have chosen to view Sacheverell’s sermon as a 
test case for his proposition. Nevertheless there is considerable evidence that Shaftesbury 
was sympathetic to the Whig decision to use the law to hit back at anti-toleration 
opposition, even if his own relationship with the Whig leadership was tense at best.47  
Shaftesbury’s personal involvement in the impeachment was peripheral, his 
chronic ill health precluding him from attending the House of Lords during the 
proceedings. It is certain he kept a close eye on events, however, because there is a hand-
written account of the 16 March debate on the first article of impeachment among the 
Shaftesbury papers that was prepared for the earl’s own private reading.48 Friends and 
allies also kept him informed of events and of the urgent need to shape public perception 
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of the proceedings against Sacheverell. In late December 1709 Toland sent him his Lettre 
d’un Anglois à un Hollandois, au sujet du Docteur Sacheverell explaining that he 
intended by it to remedy any misinterpretation of Sacheverell’s “infamous libel” that 
“foreners” reading translations of his sermon might be prone to.49 More importantly, we 
also can surmise from his correspondence what way Shaftesbury was leaning on the issue 
of how best to counter Sacheverell’s influence. Writing to his protégé Michael 
Ainsworth, the earl expressed satisfaction that the Parliament “at this instant” was 
proceeding “against Sacheveril.”50 The letter is dated 30 December 1709, a little over two 
weeks after Parliament voted to initiate impeachment proceedings (the trial itself would 
not begin until late February 1710). Thus, although we cannot know whether Shaftesbury 
was fully apprised as to the set of options available to the Whig Parliamentarians, he 
seems to have been comfortable with their ultimate recourse to the unorthodox method of 
Parliamentary impeachment. In any case, it is clear that Shaftesbury believed 
Sacheverell’s actions to be deserving of punishment of some sort. When explaining to Le 
Clerc why he had to flee “instantly” to his country estate at Wimborne St Giles in July of 
1710, he blamed the “ferment which the seditious High Churchman (Sacheverell) has 
raised.”51 There is nothing in this letter to suggest that the tumultuous fallout from the 
trial had anything to do with Whig overreach. Instead, Sacheverell’s “seditious” 
(implying illegal) behavior was entirely to blame.  
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Unbeknownst to him at the time of writing to Ainsworth, Shaftesbury was to play 
an indirect role in the trial itself. In order to demonstrate that Sacheverell’s warnings of a 
conspiracy against the Church had a basis in fact, lawyers for his defense read aloud from 
a number of putatively blasphemous works, including no less than six passages from 
Shaftesbury’s anonymously published Letter Concerning Enthusiasm.52 Sacheverell’s 
lawyers could not expose Shaftesbury’s authorship of the Letter, but they could, and did, 
exploit its contents to paint an image of a full frontal assault on the institution of the 
Church and revealed religion more generally. When Parliament ordered Sacheverell’s 
sermons to be publicly burned as part of his sentence, it ordered the Collections of 
passages referr'd to by Dr. Henry Sacheverell in his answer to the articles of his 
impeachment, the volume containing the Shaftesbury excerpts, to be burned alongside 
them.53 
Although the Sacheverell trial concluded in March, it dominated political 
discussion for the remainder of the year. This means that Shaftesbury’s Soliloquy, or 
Advice to an Author, completed towards the end of May 1710, was most likely written 
when the controversy was at its height, and there is evidence in his own and others’ 
letters that the text was written with it squarely in mind. When Shaftesbury sent a copy of 
the newly completed work to Somers on 26 May he alluded to a “late Combustion in the 
literate World,” a probable reference to the general commotion generated by the trial, but 
also conceivably a wry reference to the more literal combustion of the excerpts from his 
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own writings.54 Moreover, one of Shaftesbury’s closest friends and parliamentary 
mouthpieces, Sir John Cropley, unhesitatingly interpreted the Soliloquy as a blow struck 
in defense of Whigs bruised by the post-trial backlash.55 Writing in June 1710 to James 
Stanhope, a leading manager of the trial who was busy fending off Tory accusations of 
sodomy and religious profanity, Cropley reassured him that Shaftesbury, by publishing 
the Soliloquy, had already entered the fray on behalf of embattled Whigs like him.56  
What this all suggests is that when Shaftesbury wrote Soliloquy in the spring of 
1710 he did so as a committed opponent of pre-publication censorship, but one who felt 
the itch to suppress the public voice of a despised High-Church cleric who had 
capitalized on a less regulated printing environment and who could not be silenced by 
ridicule. Set aside now were his earlier apprehensions about incautious deists and free 
thinkers. The commotions of 1710 had revealed the Sacheverellites to be the far greater 
concern and so they moved to the front and center of Shaftesbury’s thinking. This must 
be born in mind in our interpretation of Soliloquy, to which we now turn.     
 
III. Authorized and Unauthorized Speech: Shaftesbury’s Soliloquy   
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Sacheverell had gained celebrity at least in part because the chaos of the print 
trade made possible the rapid dissemination of his sermons through pirated editions. By 
enacting the Copyright Act in April 1710 Parliament had acted to restrict unauthorized 
publication activity of this sort. The Act had been due to come into effect in March but 
the House of Lords made a series of amendments, one of which bolstered the interest of 
authors by ensuring that intellectual property in their work would revert to them rather 
than to printers or booksellers upon expiration of copyright.57 Readers of the 1710 edition 
of Shaftesbury’s Soliloquy were greeted on the opening page by a note addressed from 
the “Printer to the Reader” containing a thinly veiled allusion to these developments: 
  
‘Twou’d be in vain for me to protest to you, that it is I, 
myself (the true and lawful Printer of these Papers) who, 
by these Presents, address You, in my own proper Sense 
and Words. You will neither believe I write what I write, or 
think what I think. For ‘tis the Misfortune of us Printers; 
that having so freely accommodated our Authors with our 
Name and Person, we have neither left to us for our private 
Use, nor are suppos’d to have any Speech or Utterance of 
our own.58   
The “Misfortune” of the printer robbed of his voice was that the drive to concentrate 
ownership for a work in its author did away with a system in which printers could 
alternately profit or suffer from having some responsibility for it imputed to them. Defoe 
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had made a case for authorial copyright partly because the printer John How sold an 
edition of his works without his consent.59 On the flip side, John Morphew, the printer of 
Soliloquy and so ostensive author of the above note, was himself arrested the previous 
year for his role in publishing the second volume of Delarivier Manley’s New Atlantis 
and was only released when Manley took responsibility for the book as author.60 The 
final irony of the printer’s note is that, far from being voiceless, many printers had been 
quite vocal lobbyists for the restoration of some version of licensing in the years after 
1695 and were involved in negotiations over the 1710 Act.61 
The printer’s note served only as a foretaste, however, of a more pointed 
commentary on the problems of unauthorized speech in the body of the Soliloquy itself.  
Soliloquy’s sub-title (“Advice to an Author”) invites the reader to expect a kind of manual 
for aspiring writers eager to exercise their new rights and exploit the growing 
opportunities for committing their thoughts to print. In fact, Shaftesbury made clear at the 
outset that his aim was less to dispense advice than to comment on the “the way and 
manner of advising” itself.62 To advise, he explained, was to exercise a kind of “mastery” 
over the advisee, raising the question of who may legitimately lay claim to such power 
and to what end.63 Part of Shaftesbury’s purpose in Soliloquy was to expose many 
authors’ pretensions to advise as spurious, his targets ranging from self-proclaimed 
advisers to Princes, to modern philosophers lecturing their readers on morals. My 
particular focus here, however, is on how Shaftesbury undercut the claim, advanced by 
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Sacheverell during his defense, that clerics enjoyed special authorization to advise the 
public. In doing so, Shaftesbury also specified conditions under which authors could 
emerge with better entitlement to make such a claim. More specifically, the humbling of 
the clergy needed to be accompanied by (i) the rise of authors whose authority to address 
the public derived from their self-knowledge and self-command, (ii) critics capable of 
judging work on its worth while disregarding any special pleading by the author, and (iii) 
a state ready to nullify any speech that could harm the public but that could not be 
contained by less formal means.   
 
(i) Self-converse and the self-authorized author   
  
Shaftesbury’s opening shot against clerical pretensions came early in Soliloquy 
when he mischievously suggested that the quality of public speech would increase if 
clerics could only be made to censor themselves through a rigorous form of what he 
termed “Self-converse.”64 Drawing on a story from Xenophon’s Anabasis, Shaftesbury 
offered a mock-serious reflection on how a society may use self-converse to protect itself 
from clerical harangues. As Shaftesbury related it, a society called the Mossynoecians 
had been “much pestered with Orators and Preachers” (the parallel with Sacheverell’s 
England is clear) before a “sage Legislator” decreed that everyone should “speak, laugh, 
use action, gesticulate and do all in the same manner by themselves as when they were in 
company.”65 Ensuring that everyone gave “vent” to their “loquacious humour” by 
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speaking aloud in private, this legislator spared the public “the Torrent of Words” and 
“Flux of Speech” they had previously been subjected to.66  
Notice that what the Mossynoecians had established was effectively a censorship 
regime that prevented unwanted speech from reaching the ear of the public while 
replacing the magistrate’s monitoring with citizens “arguing with themselves, reproving, 
counselling, haranguing themselves… and accosting their own Persons.”67 Defoe had 
argued his case against licensing by stressing that only “despotick governments” have 
“preventive laws” to stop crimes of speech before they are committed.68 Locke had 
similarly maintained that the principle of “gaging [sic] a man for fear he should talk 
heresie or sedition” would, taken to its logical extreme, lead to the mass imprisonment of 
everyone the magistrate suspects “may be guilty of Treason or misdemeanour.”69 As we 
have seen, all the indications are that Shaftesbury had a similar disdain for pre-
publication censorship. In appropriating the story of the Mossynoecians, however, he 
playfully endorsed a different kind of preventative regime, one that displaces the burden 
of prevention onto the speakers themselves who “Discharge” privately in order that they 
might appear with “less froth and scum in public.”70   
Shaftesbury was under no illusions that the self-censoring of the Mossynoecians 
could ever become a “national practice” in England.71 But he did make clear the public 
benefit that would follow if clerics in particular could be made to resist the urge to rush 
their thoughts into print. Expressing disdain for the practice whereby authors publish 
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their “Meditations, occasional reflections, solitary Thoughts or other such Exercises” he 
singled out “religious” versions of such publications as “undoubtedly the worst.”72 The 
compunction to make public what should be kept private was a pathology, Shaftesbury 
implied, one to which those “addicted to write after the manner of holy Advisers” were 
especially prone.73 
There is little indication Shaftesbury thought such “holy Advisers” could be 
induced to withhold inflicting the public with their “froth.” He did, however, more 
earnestly recommend self-converse to another kind of author that could counter-balance 
their influence. Much of Soliloquy was devoted to advancing the view that if Whig 
gentlemen could learn to regulate their passions then they will write (and advise) with 
greater authority on moral and political matters than any conferred upon clerics by the 
Church. Such authority must, Shaftesbury insisted, be developed from within by a Stoic 
practice of self-converse not unlike that the earl subjected himself to during his retreats 
from public life in Rotterdam. To preserve himself from the loss of self-control that 
accompanies false beliefs about nature or the good, the earl during those retreats had 
interrogated verbally whatever ideas passed before his mind: “Let me examine my Ideas, 
challeng & talk with them thus, before they be admitted to pass.  Idea! wayt a little. Stay 
for me, till I am ready: till I have recollected myself: Come on.  Let us see.  What art 
Thou? & from whence? ”74 In Soliloquy Shaftesbury exhorted his authors to adopt a 
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similar “Regimen or Discipline of the Fancys” based on the same method of verbal self-
interrogation and with a similar goal of self-mastery in view.75  
How, though, could self-mastery translate into the authority to advise others and 
write for their benefit? Answering this requires some background into how Shaftesbury 
interpreted the Stoic tradition. In a much-cited 1706 letter to his Huguenot correspondent 
Pierre Coste, Shaftesbury reduced the history of philosophy to a struggle between 
unsociable Epicureans and a “civil, social” Stoicism that emphasizes “concernment in 
civil affairs” all the while making clear his allegiance to the latter camp.76 On 
Shaftesbury’s view, then, the student of Stoicism does not engage in self-converse with 
an eye to their own virtue and happiness alone but instead must keep the benefit of the 
community as a whole firmly in view. Or, rather, the writers that emerge from Stoic self-
therapy, having attained control within themselves, should now also be prepared to act, 
speak, or remain silent as their civic station may require, minimizing any conflict 
between their public and private interest. The qualifications they have gained from 
knowledge of their own passions, Shaftesbury implied, better entitled them to the public’s 
ear than any credential conferred from without.    
Shaftesbury never deigned to predict what kind of works his self-authorized 
authors practicing this technique would produce. But he did make clear that they would 
occasionally withhold writings they would otherwise submit to the public if motivated by 
non-Stoic considerations such as wealth or reputation.77 In Soliloquy he was particularly 
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concerned to wean his new breed of authors away from the temptations offered by the 
rampant commercialism characteristic of the new print environment.78 As Shaftesbury 
saw it English authors were constantly at risk of becoming debased by allowing 
themselves to be swayed the “Frowns or Favour” of grandee patrons or “the Applause or 
Censure of the Criticks.”79 They were abetted in this, however, by a growing print 
industry eager to profit from literary controversies.80 Writing later in the text as the 
anonymous author of Soliloquy, Shaftesbury denied that he had written for fame or 
monetary gain, having relinquished any rights he had over his text to his printer, whom 
he had allowed to make “as many [copies] as he pleases for his own benefit.”81 The 
vulgar “traffic” of selling books for a market flooded with new presses is something that 
Soliloquy’s author wants no part in, implying that prospective authors should likewise 
resist the temptation to exploit the plentiful new opportunities for quick publicity or 
profit.82 Shaftesbury’s wager in Soliloquy was that authors that have acquired self-
knowledge before going to print could actively reform the reading public rather than 
being molded by its changing whims. Moral and political instruction, even if delivered 
through humor or raillery, required a kind of moral seriousness that only self-conversing 
authors could exhibit, and that certainly no religious affiliation could bestow.  
 
(ii) The critic as censure 
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While Stoic self-converse was necessary to the development of an author it was 
not sufficient. An author’s Stoic training would come to little without an audience of 
critics receptive to the unaffected style such preparation would produce. Shaftesbury was 
reticent about openly promoting popular engagement with ancient Stoic texts and there 
are remarkably few references to them in the Characteristics as compared with his 
private manuscripts.83 But even if widespread familiarity with ancient Stoic method was 
out of the question, Shaftesbury was optimistic that modern norms of politeness could be 
made to serve as a viable standard against which critics could offer suitable judgments. 
Unsurprisingly, it was precisely these modern standards of decorum that clerics flouted 
most egregiously. The “Saint Author,” he complained, refused to 
regulate his Stile or Language by the Standard of good Company […]. 
He is above the Consideration of that which in a narrow sense we call 
Manners. Nor is he apt to examine any other faults than those he calls 
Sins: Tho a Sinner against good Breeding, and the Laws of Decency, will 
no more be look’d on as a good Author than a Sinner against Grammar, 
good Argument, or good Sense.84 
 
As we have seen, Sacheverell’s preaching raised hackles among the Whig elite less 
because of what he said than his manner of saying it. William Bisset remarked before 
Sacheverell’s impeachment trial that he “did not know how the Lords would deal with 
him; but if he were to be tried by a jury of grammarians and critics he could hope for no 
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mercy.”85 Shaftesbury here retrospectively subjected Sacheverell (unnamed in the text 
but a likely target) to such a trial, or rather, he invited his readers to do so, sensitizing 
them to “sins” of authorship that clerics were particularly prone to commit. Armed with 
rules of criticism, those readers should be ready to take Sacheverell to task not for his 
murky libeling but for his much more certain “sins” against “breeding,” “grammar,” and 
“good Argument.”  
 What kind of “sins” should Shaftesbury’s critics have looked out for? In Soliloquy 
Shaftesbury was particularly keen to place his readers on guard against the ways in which 
authors interposed their own personal or institutional authority between the reader and the 
text. Most troublesome in this regard, he warned, was modern authors’ use of “Prefaces, 
Dedications and Introductions” to plead forgiveness in advance for any infelicities or 
errors committed in the body of the work itself.86 Even the word “preface,” the earl 
contemptuously remarked, had become “only another word to signify excuse.”87 
Allowing authors to defend or explain themselves via preface, Shaftesbury implied, was 
to afford them too much credit in advance. Dedicatory Epistles had similarly ill effects, 
allowing even anonymous authors to slyly draw attention to their social position, 
advertise their prestigious affiliations, or even have some “great Man’s Reputation” 
reflect positively upon them.88 In effect, Shaftesbury claimed, prefaces and dedications 
allowed considerations extraneous to the text to impact the reader’s judgment before they 
had even turned over the first page. 
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Again, what looked at first brush like a plea for a text to be judged on the merit of 
its content alone looks far less politically innocent when viewed in light of the 
Sacheverell trial and ensuing controversy. The question of how prefaces and dedicatory 
epistles were to be interpreted featured prominently in the impeachment proceedings at 
Westminster Hall, proving central to both the Whig prosecution’s case and to 
Sacheverell’s defense strategy. To begin with, the prosecution based their charges against 
Sachevell not only on The Perils of False Brethren but also on the dedication he had 
affixed to an earlier sermon, The Communication of Sin, that Sacheverell had preached at 
Derby in August of 1709. The Whig prosecutors insisted that this dedication (though not 
the sermon itself) be read aloud to show how Sacheverell had used an apparently 
innocuous compliment to his dedicatee and “relation,” George Sacheverell, High Sheriff 
of Derby, to insinuate that the Church was under threat with Anne on the throne.89 
Sacheverell’s fawning praise for the sheriff’s service to the Queen at a time of crisis, the 
Whigs argued, harbored the seditious suggestion that a crisis had indeed been allow to 
arise under the Queen’s watch.   
In his speech from the dock Sacheverell complained that this reading of his 
“sermons and prefaces” was an interpretive leap too far.90 But if Sacheverell wished to 
deflect attention away from one of his dedications, he and his defense team leaned 
heavily in their own arguments upon another, namely the dedication to Samuel Gerrard, 
Lord Mayor of London that accompanied The Perils of False Brethren. In his initial 
answer to the articles of impeachment Sacheverell pleaded that Gerrard had “induced” 
him to publish the sermon and that this should mitigate his responsibility for the unrest 
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caused by its wide circulation.91 His defense team later reiterated this same argument at 
greater length. The lawyer Humphrey Henchman, speaking for Sacheverell on the eighth 
day of the trial, objected to the Whig managers’ accusation that Sacheverell had been 
deliberately provocative in the timing and location of his sermon on the grounds that the 
dedication to Gerrard revealed him to have had no say in selecting either. Sacheverell, 
Henchman argued, had been merely performing a “duty” at the behest of a “public 
magistrate.”92 
It was precisely this tactic whereby an author covers his tracks by associating 
himself with an authority the reader is likely to respect that spurred Shaftesbury’s 
hostility to “the anticipating Manner of prefatory Discourse” in Soliloquy.93 By alerting 
his new critics to the insidious power of the preface and dedication, Shaftesbury 
encouraged them to “censure” publications freely without allowing whatever 
authorization the author might boast of, or whatever respect they might command in other 
realms, to impinge upon their judgment.94 This applied to clerical publications as much 
(if not more so) than to lay authors. High-Church clerics might plead, as Sacheverell did 
during his trial, that the “dignity” of their “office” entitled them to “rebuke with 
authority” from the pulpit.95 But in Shaftesbury’s view they could never exercise 
comparable authority once they entered the “commonwealth of letters” and should expect 
little mercy there from Shaftesbury’s new critics.96  
 
                                                
91 Ibid., 40.  Gerrard would deny during the trial that he had commanded Sacheverell to publish the sermon.   
92 Ibid., 358. 
93 Shaftesbury, Soliloquy, 170.  
94 Ibid., 41.  
95 State Trials, XV, 376 
96Shaftesbury, Soliloquy, 40. 
 32 
(iii) The Corrective Role of the Magistrate  
 
For all his efforts to reform authors and critics, Shaftesbury still retained a role for 
the state to step in and correct, on an ad hoc basis, harmful speech that informal 
censuring failed to regulate. This is particularly evident from part II, section 2 of 
Soliloquy where the earl inserted a surprising endorsement of the use of law by the 
ancient Greeks and Romans to regulate offensive speech. Earlier commentators on 
ancient attitudes towards censorship, such as Shaftesbury’s philosophical nemesis 
Thomas Hobbes, had insisted that ancient societies were notable for their lack of any 
such laws. On Hobbes’ interpretation, if the harm caused by what he termed “contumely” 
did not extend beyond personal offense of the victim then ancient societies had little 
interest in criminalizing it.97 Shaftesbury, by contrast, claimed not only that the ancients 
did enact such laws but also commented approvingly on their efficacy in keeping public 
deliberations free of harmful speech.  
Taking, as his first example, Athenian laws regulating comedy, Shaftesbury set 
out to address two misperceptions about what the Athenians were trying to achieve by 
them.98 First, he placed his readers on guard against the “great Error” of supposing that 
“restraining” the more “licentious manner of Wit, by Law” was a “Violation of the 
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Liberty of the Athenian State.”99 To counter this misunderstanding, Shaftesbury affirmed 
the wisdom of prescribing by law whatever is “injurious to the good name and reputation 
of every citizen” and argued that this contributed to “an increase of liberty” rather than a 
restriction.100 The second misperception he targeted was that these laws were attributable 
to the influence of Sparta on Athenian politics in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian war. 
To counter this argument Shaftesbury pleaded that the Spartans would have been “little 
concern’d” about “what manner those citizens treated each other in their Comedys,” and 
reminded his readers that the Athenians had in any case seen fit to retain the measures 
after the Sparta-supported Thirty had fallen from power.101  
To reinforce the point still further, Shaftesbury cited the example of another polite 
government of antiquity, Augustus’ Rome, where the Fescennine verses and the fabulae 
Atellanae were prohibited “for the public’s sake” because they had been found to be 
“contrary to the just Liberty of the people.”102 Contrary to liberty, that is, because even 
citizens who had yet to be targeted could perceive that to live under constant threat of 
defamation would be intolerable.103 Note how in both of these examples Shaftesbury 
presented the law as a legitimate instrument that states had historically availed of in order 
to curb speech that menaced a free political life.104  
Even Shaftesbury’s followers felt obliged to gloss over this aspect of the 
Soliloquy because it seemed so plainly at odds with his earlier championing of the 
freedom to ridicule in the Letter Concerning Enthusiasm and Sensus Communis, an Essay 
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on the Freedom of Wit and Humour. To take a prominent example, in 1729 Anthony 
Collins published A Discourse Concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing, a text 
justifiably referred to by its editors as a “crude but powerful reworking of Shaftesbury’s 
Sensus Communis.” But while Collins echoed (and copiously cited) Shaftesbury, he was 
obliged to depart from the earl’s line of argument when it came to the topic of ancient 
censorship.105 Collins’ target was the supposition, widely circulated by defenders of the 
established Church, that a freer press environment and greater license to ridicule unduly 
favored dissenters. To undermine this claim, Collins catalogued instances whereby 
defenders of the Church had themselves enjoyed great success with ridicule, specifically 
against “enthusiasts” and Catholics.106 But the central pillar of Collins’ argument was the 
historical claim that “all polite Governments” had refrained from legally regulating 
ridicule, permitting it instead as a means of employing “innocently and usefully the 
vacant hours of many, who know not how to employ their Time, or would employ it 
amiss by entering into factions and Cabals to disturb the state.”107 The lesson to be drawn 
was that any “[a]ttempt to make a Law to restrain” such speech in a modern polite society 
would “prove abortive” and be popularly “deem’d the Effect of …present Anger at a poor 
Jest.”108 This was a cogent historical argument against censorship, but it was not 
Shaftesbury’s. In looking to the earl for argumentative fodder, Collins was wise to 
consult Sensus Communis and avoid the Soliloquy.   
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It might be objected that Shaftesbury only defended these ancient laws as 
temporary measures to encourage more refined public speech, with official censorship 
gradually ceding place to the censuring of a polite public. But Shaftesbury’s support for 
the impeachment of Sacheverell points to a different possibility. What the Sacheverell 
controversy revealed was that there will always, even in a polite commercial society free 
of pre-publication censorship, be speakers who prosper by flagrantly defying the norms 
of politeness and the critics who uphold them, and whose antics threaten religious and 
political freedom. It is in such instances that Shaftesbury’s faith in the capacity of humor 
to “refine itself” became strained and recourse to law became necessary.  
In carving out a role for the state, however, Shaftesbury was careful to rule out 
any return to a licensing system as incompatible with the freedom of thought he so 
ardently defended. This is especially evident from a passage in which the earl satirically 
portrayed agitators for print regulation as arbitrarily fixating upon one mechanism for 
inscribing words onto paper over others. 
I am nowise more an Author for being in Print. I am 
conscious to my self of no additional Virtue, or dangerous 
Quality, from having lain at any time under the weight of 
that alphabetick Engine call’d the Press. […] To allow 
Benefit of Clergy and to restrain the press seems to me to 
have something of a Cross-purpose in it. I can hardly think 
that the Quality of what is written can be altered by the 
Manner of Writing, or that there can be any harm in a quick 
way of copying fair and keeping Copys alike. Why a man 
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may not be permitted to write with Iron as well as Quill, I 
can’t conceive; or how a writer changes his Capacity by his 
new Dress any more than by the wear of Wove Stockins, 
after having worn no other manufacture than the Knit.109 
 
Once the mystique of the printing press has been punctured then choosing its iron 
over a quill pen is suddenly as inconsequential as the choice of one kind of stocking over 
another, and would as senseless to restrain. The reference to the “Benefit of Clergy” in the 
passage suggests that for Shaftesbury the group most concerned to reinstate such 
restraints remained clerics and their supporters, eager to restore the small degree of 
Church control over publishing that licensing had afforded them. When read in light of 
the Sacheverell affair and its aftermath this might come across initially as politically 
naïve. That the High-Church alone stood to lose by the elimination of press restraints had, 
after all, already been rendered doubtful by Sacheverell’s hugely successful exploitation 
of the print medium. Shaftesbury’s considered position, however, was that so long as the 
Church remained subordinate to the state, and suitable mechanisms for punishing those 
who denied this arrangement remained in place, then there was little to be feared (and 
much to be gained) from a free press.   
This was all to assume, however, that the subordination of the Church to the state 
was secure, something that in 1710 looked far from certain. Despite Soliloquy’s generally 
upbeat tone regarding the prospects of liberty in England, Shaftesbury ended it with a 
pungent reminder to his readers that preserving religious freedoms would require not just 
ad hoc corrective interventions but also continual state oversight of clerical activities. As 
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Philip Connell has recently observed, the closing pages of Soliloquy contained a 
trenchant attack on the Sacheverellites, and convey the urgent necessity of keeping 
Church authority within what Shaftesbury considered its proper bounds.110 To clarify 
what those bounds were, Shaftesbury sarcastically conceded that matters of theology and 
church history could only be “determined by the initiated, or ordain’d: to whom the State 
has assign’d the Guardianship and Promulgation of the Divine Oracles.”111 But even on 
these matters within its remit, he slyly suggested, the Church’s authority could never be 
entirely trusted, noting that few accounts of sacred history were available to cross check 
the Church’s version of events other than those of the Church’s “own licensing and 
composing” (yet another reference to the clerical penchant for licensing). In affirming 
that the Church’s authority derived ultimately solely from “the State,” moreover, 
Shaftesbury gloried in its recent political humbling in the years following 1688. The 
Church, he approvingly noted, was now in a position of dependence analogous to knights 
who had been “reduc’d by Law […] from the power they once enjoyed.”112 Finally, by 
defining the Church’s remit as religious matters alone, Shaftesbury excluded it from 
offering “instruction and advice” on “manners” more generally, a task he reserved for his 
new authors.113 Should some member of the Church defy these limits, he implied, then 
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 If Shaftesbury hoped for Soliloquy to have some immediate effect then he must 
have been disappointed. The months following its publication saw Sacheverell process 
triumphantly throughout England (having been banned from preaching and publishing for 
just three years) and a Tory general election victory. If its short-term impact proved 
negligible, however, the much larger Characteristics of Men, Manner, Opinions, Times 
into which it was eventually incorporated sealed Shaftesbury’s reputation for much of the 
eighteenth century and was foundational to its debates on how criticism could inform 
moral and political debate. In closing, however, I want to suggest how restoring 
Shaftesbury’s Soliloquy to its immediate context of political action, as I have done here, 
might still be instructive today. 
In the first place, the case of Shaftesbury’s Soliloquy should prompt us to be more 
circumspect in how we regard the consensus favoring free speech that supposedly 
emerged in early eighteenth-century England. Peter Lake and Stephen Pincus have 
argued that the public sphere of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was 
distinct from earlier, more sporadic, public spheres partly because uninhibited public 
communication had at last come to be seen as “normatively desirable” by nearly all 
political actors.114 But fixating on such a convergence of opinion can cause us to lose 
sight of crucial ambivalences about free communication even within the positions of 
those who ranked among its most ardent supporters. What Shaftesbury’s case indicates is 
that one and the same author could argue a strong case for the freedom to ridicule, while 
pressing hard for the disciplining of speakers whose words threaten the political 
conditions they deemed crucial to a free public life (in this case toleration and the 
                                                
114 Peter Lake and Stephen Pincus, “Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England,” Journal of 
British Studies 45/2 (2006), 270-292, at 290.   
 39 
subordination of the clergy to the state). However dearly he may have valued the free 
clash of argument, Shaftesbury was not nearly so naïve as many have assumed about the 
coercive forces that needed to be marshaled order to secure a public space in which 
“amicable collision” between authors, critics, and conversers more generally could 
occur.115 In 1710 such a space was, in his eyes, not yet fully secure, and he was willing to 
condone some aggressive curtailment of clerical speech to ensure that it would be.  
 Second, Shaftesbury’s case also places us on guard against treating the freedoms 
of thought and of expression as a seamless unit in the early modern period. Philosophical 
arguments for freedom of thought were not always accompanied by yearnings for 
unrestrained public expression. In Shaftesbury’s case such arguments were instead 
accompanied by some reconsideration of how restraint on public speech should be 
legitimately imposed and to what end. For Shaftesbury in 1710, authorizing new authors 
required curbing the speech of others, or at the very least checking the privilege of clerics 
who assumed special authority to speak on the proper scope of toleration and dissent. In a 
recent study, Ethan Shagan has argued that a pro-toleration politics of restraint was alive 
and well in the early 1700s, with the crucial difference that what calls “inward self-
restraint” was increasingly privileged as the means of discipline ahead of overt regulation 
by the state.116 Shaftesbury played a part in ushering in that politics, doubling as a 
staunch opponent of licensing and a theorist of self-restraint who called on prospective 
authors to acquire self-command before presuming to command the public’s ear. But he 
also retained a role for the state as the ultimate guarantor of toleration, ready to step in 
and restrain speech that ridicule or the informal censuring of critics failed to.   
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